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1 Introduction
The theory of two-sided matching and its applications has been studied since the seminal work of Gale
and Shapley (1962). Nevertheless, many real-life matching markets are subject to various constraints, such
as affirmative action in school choice. Economists and policy makers are often faced with new challenges
from such constraints. Admission policies in school choice systems often use reserves to grant applicants
from certain backgrounds higher priority for some available slots. Reservation in India is such a process
of setting aside a certain percentage of slots in government institutions for members of underrepresented
communities, defined primarily by castes and tribes. We present engineering school admissions in India
as an unprecedented matching problem with affirmative action in which students care about the category
through which they are admitted.
In engineering school admissions in India, students from different backgrounds (namely, scheduled
castes (SC), scheduled tribes (ST), other backward classes (OBC), and general category (GC))1 are treated
with different criteria. Schools reserve a certain fraction of their slots for students from SC, ST, and OBC
categories. The remaining slots at each school, which are called general category (GC) slots, are open to
competition. It is optional for SC, ST, and OBC students to declare their background information. Those
who do declare their background information are considered for the reserved slots in their respective
category, as well as for the GC slots. Students who do not belong to SC, ST, or OBC categories are
considered only for GC slots. Students belonging to SC, ST, and OBC communities who do not reveal
their background information are only considered for GC slots. Aygün and Turhan (2017) documented that
students from SC, ST, and OBC categories have preferences not only for schools but also for the category
through which they are admitted. Hence, students from these communities may prefer not to declare
their caste and tribe information in the application process. Besides this strategic calculation burden on
students, the current admission procedure2 suffers from a crucial market failure: The assignment procedure
fails to transfer some unfilled slots reserved for under-privileged castes and tribes to the use of remaining
students. Hence, it is quite wasteful.
We address real-life applications as follows: There are schools and students to be matched. Each
school initially reserves a certain number of its slots for different privilege groups (or student types). A
given student may possibly match with a given school under more than one type. Each school has a
pre-specified sequence3 in which different sets of slots are considered, and where each set accepts students
in a single privilege type. Different schools might have different orders. Since a student might have more
than one privilege type, the set of students cannot be partitioned into privilege groups. Each student has a
preference over school-privilege type pairs. Students care not only about which school they are matched to
but also about the privilege type under which they are admitted. Each school has a target distribution of
its slots over privilege types, but they do not consider these target distributions as hard bounds4. If there
is less demand from at least one privilege type, schools are given the opportunity to utilize vacant slots
1Students who do not belong to SC, ST, and OBC categories are called general category (GC) applicants.
2Admission to the Indian Institute of Technologies (IITs) and its matching-theoretical shortcomings are explained in detail
in Aygün and Turhan (2017).
3We will call this sequence a precedence sequence, which is different than the precedence order from Kominers and Sönmez
(2016). Precedence order is a linear order over the set of student types. Precedence sequence, on the other hand, is more
general in the sense that a given student type might appear multiple times. A technical definition will be given in the model
section.
4Hard bounds and soft bounds are analyzed in detail in Hafalır et al. (2013) and Ehlers et al. (2014).
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by transferring them over to other privilege types. Authorities might require a certain capacity transfer
scheme so that each school has a complete plan where they state how they want to redistribute these
slots. Thus, we take capacity transfer schemes exogenously given. The only mild condition imposed on
the capacity transfer scheme is monotonicity,5 which requires that (1) if more slots are left from one or
more sets, the capacity of the sets considered later in the precedence sequence must be weakly higher, and
(2) a school cannot decrease the total capacity in response to increased demand for some sets of slots.
We design choice functions for schools that allow them to transfer capacities from low-demand privi-
lege types to high-demand privilege types. Each school respects an exogenously given precedence sequence
between different sets of slots when it fills its slots. Each school has a strict priority ordering (possibly
different than the other schools’) over all students. For each school, priority orderings for different privilege
types are straightforwardly derived from the school’s priority ordering. There is an associated choice func-
tion, which we call a “sub-choice function,” for each set of slots. In Indian engineering school admissions,
sub-choice functions are q-responsive. That is, a sub-choice function always selects the q-best students
with respect to the priority ordering of the associated privilege type at that school, where q denotes the
capacity.
The school starts filling its first set of slots according to its precedence sequence. Given the initial
capacity of the first set of slots and a contract set, the sub-choice function associated with the first set
selects contracts. The school then moves to the second set according to its precedence sequence. The
(dynamic) capacity of the second set is a function of the number of unfilled slots in the first set. The
exogenous capacity transfer function of the school specifies the capacity of the second set. The set of
available contracts for the second set of slots is computed as follows: If a student has one of her contracts
chosen by the first set, then all of her contracts are removed for the rest of the choice process. Given the
set of remaining contracts and the capacity, the sub-choice function associated with the second set selects
contracts. In general, the (dynamic) capacity of set k is a function of the number of vacant slots of the
k − 1 sets that precede it. The set of contracts available to the set of slots k is computed as follows: If a
student has one of her contracts chosen by one of the k − 1 sets of slots that precede the kth set, then all
of her contracts are removed. Given the set of remaining contracts for the set of slots k and its capacity,
the sub-choice function associated with the set k selects contracts. The (overall) choice of a school is the
union of sub-choices of its sets of slots.
We propose a remedy for the Indian engineering school admissions problem through a matching with
contracts model that has the ability to utilize vacant slots of certain types for other students. We have three
design objectives: stability, strategy-proofness and respect for improvements. Stability ensures that (1) no
student is matched with an unacceptable school-slot category pair, (2) schools’ dynamic reserves choices
are respected, and (3) no student desires a slot at which she has a justified claim under the priority and
precedence structure. Strategy-proofness guarantees that students can never game the allocation mecha-
nism via preference manipulation. In our framework, it also relieves students of the strategic manipulation
burden, which involves whether or not students declare their background.6 Respect for improvements7
is an essential property in meritocratic systems. In allocation mechanisms that respect improvements,
5Westkamp (2013) introduces this monotonicity condition on capacity transfer schemes.
6Strategy-proofness ensures that it is a weakly dominant strategy for each student to report their caste and tribe infor-
mation.
7See Kominers (2019) for detailed discussion of respect for improvements in matching markets.
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students have no incentive to lower their standings in schools’ priority rankings.
We propose the cumulative offer mechanism (COM) as an allocation rule. We prove that the COM is
stable with respect to schools’ dynamic reserve choice functions (Theorem 1), is (weakly) group strategy-
proof (Theorem 2), and respects improvements (Theorem 3). The main result of the paper (Theorem 4)
states that when a single school’s choice function becomes “more flexible,”8 while those of the other schools
remain unchanged, the outcome of the COM under the former Pareto dominates the outcome under the
latter. Theorem 4 is of particular importance because it describes a strategy-proof Pareto improvement.
Related Literature
The school choice problem was first introduced by the seminal paper of Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003).
The authors introduced a simple affirmative action policy with type-specific quotas. Kojima (2012) showed
that the minority students who purported to be the beneficiaries might instead be made worse off under
this type of affirmative action. To circumvent inefficiencies caused by majority quotas, Hafalır et al. (2013)
offer minority reserves. Westkamp (2013) introduced a model of matching with complex constraints. His
model permits priorities to vary across slots. We allow each student to have multiple types whereas
Westkamp (2013) assumes that each student has just one type. Students have strict preferences for type-
specific matches with schools in our framework. This aspect differentiates our paper from Westkamp
(2013). Moreover, our comparative statics result on transfer schemes does not have a counterpart in
Westkamp (2013).
In a related work, Biró et al. (2010) analyze a college admission model with common and upper
quotas in the context of Hungarian college admissions. They use choice functions for colleges that allow
them to select multiple contracts of the same applicant. They show that a stable assignment exists. The
completions of dynamic reserves choice functions, discussed in Appendix 7.2, satisfy the properties they
impose. Hence, their result also implies the existence of a stable allocation in our framework. However,
our main focus is different as we aim to show strategy-proof Pareto improvement by making capacity
transfer function more flexible.
The matching problem with dynamic reserves choice functions is a special case of the matching with
contracts model of Fleiner (2003)9 and Hatfield and Milgrom (2005).10 The analysis and results of Hat-
field and Kominers (2019) are the technical backbone of our results regarding stable and strategy-proof
mechanism design. We show that every dynamic reserves choice function has a completion that satisfies
the irrelevance of rejected contracts condition of Aygün and Sönmez (2013), in conjunction with substi-
tutability and the law of aggregate demand.
Kominers and Sönmez (2016) introduce another prominent family of choice functions to implement
diversity objectives in many-to-one settings. Like their model, our model permits priorities to vary across
8We define “more flexible” criterion to compare two monotonic capacity transfer schemes given a precedence sequence. We
say that a monotonic capacity transfer scheme q˜ is more flexible than monotonic capacity transfer scheme q if q˜ transfers at
least as many otherwise vacant slots as q at every instance. There must also be an instance where q˜ transfers strictly more
otherwise vacant slots than q does.
9Fleiner’s results cover these of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) regarding stability. However, Fleiner (2003) does not analyze
incentives.
10Echenique (2012) has shown that under the substitutes condition, which is thoroughly assumed in Hatfield and Milgrom
(2005), the matching with contracts model can be embedded within the Kelso and Crawford (1982) labor market model.
Kelso and Crawford (1982) built on the analysis of Crawford and Knoer (1981).
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slots. We allow more general forms of interaction across slots than they do. Moreover, our focus—strategy-
proof Pareto improvement via more flexible capacity transfers—is different than theirs.
Hatfield et al. (2017) introduce a model of hospital choice in which each hospital has a set of divisions
and flexible allotment of capacities to those divisions that vary as a function of the set of contracts available.
These authors define choice functions that nest dynamic reserves choice functions while continuing to obtain
stability and strategy-proofness for the COM. Our Theorems 3 and 4 do not have a counterpart in Hatfield
et al. (2017).
Our work is also related with the research agenda on matching with constraints that is studied in a
series of papers: Kamada and Kojima (2015), (2017), Kojima et al. (2018), and Goto et al. (2017). In
these papers, constraints are imposed on subsets of institutions as a joint restriction, as opposed to at
each individual institution. Our main results distinguish our work from these papers. We discuss the
relationship between our stability notion and that of Kamada and Kojima (2017) in Section 3.
Another related paper is Echenique and Yenmez (2015). Dynamic reserves choice functions might
seem similar to the family of choice functions the authors analyze: choice rules generated by reserves.
However, dynamic reserves choice functions choose contracts whereas choice rules generated by reserves
choose students.
Two recent papers, Sönmez and Yenmez (2019a,b), study affirmative action in India from a matching-
theoretical perspective. The authors consider both vertical and horizontal reservations11 while we consider
only vertical reservations for simplicity. Even though the reserve structure they consider is more general
than ours, the authors consider student (agent) preferences over institutions only and assume away agent
preferences over slot categories altogether. They also assume away capacity transfers between vertical
categories. Therefore, their model does not contain our model and vice versa.
2 Model
There is a finite set of students I = {i1, ..., in}, a finite set of schools S = {s1, ..., sm}, and a finite set
of student privileges (types)12 T = {t1, ..., tp}. We call Ti ⊆ T the set of privileges that student i can
claim and T = (Ti)i∈I the profile of types that students can claim. We define Xi = {i} × S × Ti as the
set of all contracts associated with student i ∈ I. We let X = ∪
i∈I
Xi be the set of all contracts. Each
contract x ∈ X is between a student i(x) and a school s(x) and specifies a privilege t(x) ∈ Ti(x). There
may be many contracts for each student-school pair. We extend the notations i(·), s(·) and t(·) to the
set of contracts for any Y ⊆ X by setting i(Y ) ≡ ∪
y∈Y
{i(y)}, s(Y ) ≡ ∪
y∈Y
{s(y)} and t(Y ) ≡ ∪
y∈Y
{t(y)}.
For Y ⊆ X, we denote Yi ≡ {y ∈ Y | i(y) = i}; analogously, we denote Ys ≡ {y ∈ Y | s(y) = s} and
Yt ≡ {y ∈ Y | t(y) = t}.
Each student i ∈ I has a (linear) preference order P i over contracts in Xi = {x ∈ X | i(x) = i} and
an outside option ∅ which represents remaining unmatched. A contract x ∈ Xi is acceptable for i (with
respect to P i) if xP i∅. We use the convention that ∅P ix if x ∈ X \Xi. We say that the contracts x ∈ X for
11Caste-based reservations for SC, ST, and OBC categories are called vertical reservations, also referred to as social
reservations. Horizontal reservations, also referred to as special reservations, are intended for other disadvantaged groups of
citizens, such as disabled persons, and women. Horizontal reservations are implemented within each vertical category. See
Sönmez and Yenmez (2019a,b) for details.
12We use the terms “type” and “privilege” interchangeably.
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which ∅P ix are unacceptable to i . The at-least-as-well relation Ri is obtained from P i as follows: xRix′
if and only if either xP ix′ or x = x′ . Let P i denote the set of all preferences over Xi ∪ {∅}. A preference
profile of students is denoted by P = (P i1 , ..., P in) ∈ ×i∈IP i. A preference profile of all students except
student il is denoted by P−il = (P
i1 , ..., P il−1 , P il+1 , ..., P in) ∈ ×i 6=ilP i.
Students have unit demand, that is, they choose at most one contract from a set of contract offers. We
assume that students always choose the best available contract, so that the choice Ci(Y ) of a student i ∈ I
from contract set Y ⊆ X is the P i-maximal element of Y (or the outside option if ∅P iy for all y ∈ Y ).13
For each school s ∈ S, qs denotes the physical capacity of school s ∈ S. We call q = (qs1 ..., qsm) the
vector of school capacities. Each school s ∈ S has a priority order pis, which is a linear order over I∪{∅}.14
Let Π = (pis1 , ..., pism) denote the priority profile of schools. For each school s ∈ S, the priority ordering
for students who can claim the privilege t ∈ T , denoted by pist , is obtained from pis as follows:
• for i, j ∈ I such that t ∈ Ti \ Tj , ipis∅, and jpis∅, ipist ∅pist j,15
• for any other i, j ∈ I, ipist j if and only if ipisj.
An allocation Y ⊆ X is a set of contracts such that each student appears in at most one contract and no
school appears in more contracts than its capacity allows. Let X denote the set of all allocations. Given
a student i and an allocation Y , we refer to the pair (s(x), t(x)) such that i(x) = i as the assignment of
student i under allocation Y . We extend student preferences over contracts to preferences over outcomes
in the natural way. We say that an allocation Y ⊆ X Pareto dominates allocation Z ⊆ X if YiRiZi for
all i ∈ I and YiP iZi for at least one i ∈ I.
2.1 Dynamic Reserves Choice Functions
Each school s ∈ S has multi-unit demand, and is endowed with a choice function Cs(·) that describes how
s would choose from any offered set of contracts. Throughout the paper, we assume that for all Y ⊆ X
and for all s ∈ S, the choice function Cs(·):
1. only selects contracts to which s is a party, i.e., Cs(Y ) ⊆ Ys, and
2. selects at most one contract with any given student.
For any Y ⊆ X and s ∈ S, we denote Rs(Y ) ≡ Y \ Cs(Y ) as the set of contracts that s rejects from Y .
We now introduce a model of dynamic reserves choice functions in which each school s ∈ S has λs
groups of slots. School s fills its groups of slots according to a precedence sequence,16 which is a surjective
function fs : {1, ..., λs} −→ T . The interpretation of fs is that school s fills the first group of slots with
fs(1)-type students, the second group of slots with fs(2)-type students, and so on. School s ∈ S has a
13To simplify our notation, the individual contracts are treated as interchangeable with singleton contract sets.
14This priority order is often determined by performance on an admission exam, by a random lottery, or dictated by law.
In engineering school admissions in India, each school ranks students according to test scores. Different schools might have
different test score rankings because they use different weighted averages of math, physics, chemistry, and biology scores
depending on the school. It is important to note that students whose test scores are under a certain threshold are deemed
as unacceptable for each school.
15∅pist j means student j is unacceptable for privilege t at school s.
16We take precedence sequences to be exogenously given. However, Dur et al. (2018) show that precedence sequences
might have significant effects on distributional objectives in the context of Boston’s school choice system.
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target distribution of its slots across different types (qt1s , ..., q
tp
s ), which means that it has qt1s slots to be
reserved for privilege t1, qt2s slots to be reserved for privilege t2, and so on. To satisfy its target reserve
structure, school s fills its slots according to the initially set capacities for each group of slots (q1s, q2s, ..., qλss )
such that
∑
j∈(fs)−1(t)
qjs = qts for all t ∈ T . If the target distribution cannot be achieved because too few
students from one or more privileges apply, then school s use an exogenously given capacity transfer
scheme that specifies how its capacity is to be redistributed. Technically, a capacity transfer scheme is
defined as follows:
Definition 1. Given a precedence sequence fs and a capacity of the first group of slots q1s, a capacity
transfer scheme of school s is a sequence of capacity functions qs = (q1s, (qks )
λs
k=2), where q
k
s : Zk−1+ −→ Z+
such that qks (0, ..., 0) = qks for all k ∈ {2, ..., λs}.
We impose a mild condition, à la Westkamp (2013), on capacity transfer functions.
Definition 2. A capacity transfer scheme qs is monotonic if, for all j ∈ {2, ..., λs} and all pairs of
sequences (rl, r˜l) such that r˜l ≥ rl for all l ≤ j − 1,
• qjs(r˜1, ..., r˜j−1) ≥ qjs(r1, ..., rj−1), and
•
j∑
m=2
[qms (r˜1, ..., r˜m−1)− qms (r1, ..., rm−1)] ≤
j−1∑
m=1
[r˜m − rm].
Monotonicity of capacity transfer schemes requires that (1) whenever weakly more slots are left unfilled
in every groups of slots preceding the jth group of slots, weakly more slots should be available for the
jth group, and (2) a school cannot decrease its total capacity in response to increased demand for some
groups of slots.
Sub-choice functions
For each group of slots at school s ∈ S, there is an associated sub-choice function cs : 2X×Z+×T −→ 2X .
Given a set of contracts Y ⊆ X, a nonnegative integer κ ∈ Z+, and a privilege t ∈ T , cs(Y, κ, t) denotes
the set of chosen contracts that name privilege t up to the capacity κ from the set of contracts Y . We
require sub-choice functions to be q-responsive given the ranking pist .
Definition 3. 17A sub-choice function cs(·, κ, t) of a group of slots at school s for privilege type t is
q-responsive if there exists a strict priority ordering pist on the set of contracts naming privilege type t and
a positive integer κ, such that for any Y ⊆ (Xs ∩Xt),
cs(Y, κ, t) =
κ∪
i=1
{y∗i }
where y∗i is defined as y
∗
1 = max
pist
Y and, for 2 ≤ i ≤ κ, y∗i = max
pist
Y \ {y∗1, ..., y∗i−1} .
In other words, a sub-choice function is q-responsive18 if there is a strict priority ordering over students
who have privilege t for which the sub-choice function always selects the highest-ranked available students
in privilege t up to the capacity.
17We adapt this definition from Chambers and Yenmez (2017).
18These types of sub-choice functions are often used in real-life applications. For example, in the cadet branch matching
processes in the USMA and ROTC, each sub-choice function is induced from a strict ranking of students according to test
scores. See Sönmez and Switzer (2013) and Sönmez (2013) for further details.
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Remark 1. Since our main real-life application is engineering school admissions in India, we shall assume
that at each school s ∈ S, and for each group of slots reserved for privilege t ∈ T , the associated sub-choice
function cs(·, ·, t) is q-responsive and obtained from pist .
Overall choice functions
The overall choice function of school s, Cs(·, fs, qs) : 2X −→ 2X , runs its sub-choice functions in an
orderly fashion given the precedence sequence fs and capacity transfer scheme qs. Given a set of contracts
Y ⊆ X, Cs(Y, f s, qs) denotes the set of chosen contracts from the set of contracts Y and is determined as
follows:
• Given q1s and Y = Y 0 ⊆ X, let Y1 ≡ cs1(Y 0, q1s, fs(1)) be the set of chosen contracts with privilege
fs(1) from Y 0. Let r1 = q1s− | Y1 | be the number of vacant slots. Define Y˜1 ≡ {y ∈ Y 0 | i(y) ∈ i(Y1)}
as the set of all contracts of students whose contracts are chosen by sub-choice function cs1(·, q1s, fs(1)).
If a contract of a student is chosen, then all of the contracts naming that student shall be removed
from the set of available contracts for the rest of the procedure. The set of remaining contracts is
then Y 1 = Y 0 \ Y˜1.
• In general, let Yk = csk(Y k−1, qks , fs(k)) be the set of chosen contracts with privilege fs(k) from the
set of available contracts Y k−1 , where qks = qks (r1, ..., rk−1) is the dynamic capacity of group of slots
k as a function of the vector of the number of unfilled slots (r1, ..., rk−1). Let rk = qks− | Yk | be the
number of vacant slots. Define Y˜k = {y ∈ Y k−1 | i(y) ∈ i(Yk)}. The set of remaining contracts is
then Y k = Y k−1 \ Y˜k.
• Given Y = Y 0 ⊆ X and the capacity of the first group of slots q1s , we define the overall choice
function of school s as Cs(Y, f s, qs) = cs1(Y 0, q1s, fs(1)) ∪ (
λs∪
k=2
csk(Y
k−1, qks (r1, ..., rk−1), fs(k))).
The primitives of the overall choices for each school s ∈ S are the precedence sequence fs, the capacity
transfer scheme qs, and the priority order pis. Since an overall choice is computed by using these primitives,
it is not one of the primitives in our model. The list (I, S,T, X, P,Π, (f s, qs, pis)s∈S) denotes a problem.
3 Stability Concept
Stability has emerged as the key to a successful matching market design. We follow the Gale and Shapley
(1962) tradition in focusing on outcomes that are stable. In the matching with contracts framework,
Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) define stability as follows: An outcome Y ⊆ X is stable if
1. YiRi∅ for all i ∈ I,
2. Cs(Y ) = Ys for all s ∈ S, and
3. there does not exist a school s ∈ S and a blocking set Z 6= Cs(Y ) such that Zs ⊆ Cs(Y ∪ Z) and
Zi = C
i(Y ∪ Z) for all i∈ i(Z).
If the first requirement (individual rationality for students) fails, then there is a student who prefers
to reject a contract that involves her (or, equivalently, there is a student who is given an unacceptable
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contract). In our context, the second condition (individual rationality for schools) requires that the schools’
choice functions are respected. If the third condition (unblockedness) fails, then there is an alternative set
of contracts that a school and students associated with a contract in that set strictly prefers.
Remark 2. Our stability notion is related to the weak stability notion of Kamada and Kojima (2017).
The authors define the feasibility constraint as a map φ : Z|H|+ −→ {0, 1}, such that φ(w) ≥ φ(w
′
)
whenever w ≤ w′ . Their interpretation is that each coordinate in w corresponds to a hospital and the
number in that coordinate represents the number of doctors matched to that hospital. φ(w) = 1 means
that w is feasible and φ(w) = 0 means it is not. They say that matching µ is feasible if and only if
φ(w(µ)) = 1, where w(µ) := (| µh |)h∈H is a vector of nonnegative integers indexed by hospitals whose
coordinates corresponding to h are | µh |. Capacity transfer functions in our setting can be represented by
the feasibility constraint map from their paper. Condition 2 in our stability definition takes into account
not only dynamic capacities of groups of seats in each school but also their precedence sequences. It is a
feasibility condition. Westkamp (2013) defines a similar condition in his “procedural stability” definition in
a simpler matching model without contracts.
4 The Cumulative Offer Mechanism and its Properties under Dynamic
Reserves Choice Functions
A direct mechanism is a mechanism where the strategy space is the set of preferences P for each student
i ∈ I, i.e., a function ψ : Pn −→ X that selects an allocation for each preference profile. We propose
the COM as our allocation function. Given the student preferences and schools’ overall choice functions,
the outcome of the COM is computed by the cumulative offer algorithm. This is the generalization of
the agent-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962). We now introduce the
cumulative offer process (COP)19 for matching with contracts. Here, we provide an intuitive description
of this algorithm; we give a more technical description in Appendix 7.1.
Definition 4. In the COP, students propose contracts to schools in a sequence of steps l = 1, 2 . . . :
Step 1 : Some student i1 ∈ I proposes his most-preferred contract, x1 ∈ Xi1 . School s
(
x1
)
holds x1
if x1 ∈ Cs(x1) ({x1}), and rejects x1 otherwise. Set A2s(x1) = {x1}, and set A2s′ = ∅ for each s′ 6= s (x1);
these are the sets of contracts available to schools at the beginning of Step 2.
Step 2 : Some student i2 ∈ I, for whom no school currently holds a contract, proposes his most-
preferred contact that has not yet been rejected, x2 ∈ Xi2 . School s
(
x2
)
holds the contract in Cs(x
2)
(
A2s(x2) ∪
{
x2
})
and rejects all other contracts in A2s(x2)∪
{
x2
}
; schools s′ 6= s (x2) continue to hold all contracts they held
at the end of Step 1. Set A3s(x2) = A
2
s(x2) ∪
{
x2
}
, and set A3s′ = A
2
s′ for each s
′ 6= s (x2).
Step l : Some student il ∈ I, for whom no school currently holds a contract, proposes his most-preferred
contact that has not yet been rejected, xl ∈ Xil . School s
(
xl
)
holds the contract in Cs(x
l)
(
Al
s(xl)
∪ {xl})
and rejects all other contracts in Al
s(xl)
∪{xl}; schools s′ 6= s (xl) continue to hold all contracts they held
at the end of Step l−1. Set Al+1
s(xl)
= Al
s(xl)
∪ {xl}, and set Al+1s′ = Als′ for each s′ 6= s (xl).
19See Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) for more details.
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If at any time no student is able to propose a new contract—that is, if all students for whom no contracts
are on hold have proposed all contract they find acceptable—then the algorithm terminates. The outcome
of the COP is the set of contracts held by schools at the end of the last step before termination.
In the COP, students propose contracts sequentially. Schools accumulate offers, choosing at each step
(according to their choice functions) a set of contracts to hold from the set of all previous offers. The
process terminates when no student wishes to propose a contract.
Given a preference profile of students P = (Pi)i∈I and a profile of choice functions for schools C =
(Cs)s∈S , let Φ (P,C) denote the outcome of the COM. Let Φi (P,C) denote the assignment of student
i ∈ I and Φs (P,C) denote the assignment of school s ∈ S.
Remark 3. We do not explicitly specify the order in which students make proposals. Hirata and Kasuya
(2014) show that in the matching with contracts model, the outcome of the COP is order-independent if
the overall choice function of every school satisfies the bilateral substitutability (BLS) and the irrelevance
of rejected contracts (IRC) conditions. Dynamic reserves choice functions satisfy BLS and IRC. Hence,
the order-independence of the COP holds.
A mechanism ϕ is stable if for every preference profile P ∈ P |I| the outcome ϕ (P ) is stable with
respect to the schools’ overall choice functions. Since the COP gives a stable outcome for every input if
each school’s capacity transfer scheme is monotonic, the COM is a stable mechanism.
Theorem 1. The cumulative offer mechanism is stable with respect to dynamic reserves choice functions.
Proof. See Appendix 7.3.
To analyze the incentive properties of the COM when schools use dynamic reserves choice functions,
we first define standard strategy-proofness and (weak) group strategy-proofness in relation to a direct
mechanism.
Definition 5. A direct mechanism ϕ is said to be strategy-proof if there does not exist a preference
profile P , a student i ∈ I, and preferences P ′i of student i such that
ϕi
(
P ′i , P−i
)
Piϕi (P ) .
That is, no matter which student we consider, no matter what her true preferences Pi are, no matter
what other preferences P−i other students report (true or not), and no matter which potential “misrepre-
sentation” P ′i student i considers, a truthful preference revelation is in her best interest. Hence, students
can never benefit from gaming the mechanism ϕ.
Definition 6. A direct mechanism ϕ is said to be weakly group strategy-proof if there is no preference
profile P , a subset of students I ′ ⊆ I, and a preference profile (Pi)i∈I′ of students in I ′ such that
ϕi
((
P ′i
)
i∈I′ , (Pj)j∈I\I′
)
Piϕi (P )
for all i ∈ I ′.
That is, no subset of students can jointly misreport their preferences to receive a strictly preferred
outcome for every member of the coalition.
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Hatfield and Kominers (2019) show that if schools’ choice functions have substitutable completions so
that these completions satisfy the LAD, then the COP becomes weakly group strategy-proof.
Theorem 2. Suppose that each school uses a dynamic reserves choice function. Then, the cumulative
offer mechanism is weakly group strategy-proof.
Proof. See Appendix 7.3.
Respect for Unambiguous Improvements
We say that priority profile Π is an unambiguous improvement over priority profile Π for student i ∈ I if,
for all schools s ∈ S, the following conditions hold:
1. For all x ∈ Xi and y ∈
(
XI\{i} ∪ {∅}
)
, if xpisy then xpisy.
2. For all y, z ∈ XI\{i}, ypisz if and only if ypisz.
That is, Π is an unambiguous improvement over priority profile Π for student i if Π is obtained from
Π by increasing the priority of some of i’s contracts while leaving the relative priority of other students’
contracts unchanged.
Definition 7. A mechanism ϕ respects unambiguous improvements for i ∈ I if for any preference
profile P ∈ ×i∈IP i
ϕi(P ; Π)R
iϕi(P ; Π)
whenever Π is an unambiguous improvement over Π for i. We say that ϕ respects unambiguous improve-
ments if it respects unambiguous improvements for each student i ∈ I.
Respect for improvements is essential in settings like ours where it implies that students never want
to intentionally decrease their test scores and, in turn, their rankings. Similarly, it is also important in
cadet-branch matching where cadets can influence their priority rankings directly. Sönmez (2013) argues
that cadets take perverse steps to lower their priorities because the mechanism used by the Reserve Officer
Training Corps (ROTC) to match its cadets to branches fails the respecting improvements property.
Theorem 3. The cumulative offer mechanism with respect to dynamic reserves choice functions respects
unambiguous improvements.
Proof. See Appendix 7.3.
5 Comparative Statics on Monotonic Capacity Transfer Schemes
In this section, we first define a comparison criteria between two monotone capacity transfer schemes.
Consider a school s ∈ S with a given precedence sequence fs and target distribution qs = (q1s, ..., qλss ). Let
qs and q˜s be two monotone capacity transfer schemes: given a vector of unused slots from group of slots
1 to j − 1, (r1, ..., rj−1) ∈ Zj−1+ , the dynamic capacity of the jth group under capacity transfer schemes qs
and q˜s are q
j
s = q
j
s(r1, ..., rj−1) and q˜
j
s = q˜
j
s(r1, ..., rj−1), respectively, for all j ≥ 2 and, q1s = q˜1s = q1s.
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Let qs and q˜s be two monotone capacity transfer schemes that are compatible with the precedence
sequence fs and target capacity vector qs of school s ∈ S. We say that the monotone capacity transfer
scheme q˜s is more flexible than the monotone capacity transfer scheme qs if
1. there exists l ∈ {2, ..., λs} and (rˆ1, ..., rˆl−1) ∈ Zl−1+ such that q˜ls(rˆ1, ..., rˆl−1) > qls(rˆ1, ..., rˆl−1), and
2. for all j ∈ {2, ..., λs} and (r1, ..., rj−1) ∈ Zj−1+ , if j 6= l or (r1, ..., rj−1) 6= (rˆ, ..., rˆl−1), then
q˜js(r1, ..., rj−1) ≥ qjs(r1, ..., rj−1).
The definition states that one monotonic capacity transfer scheme is more flexible than another if it
transfers at least as many vacant slots as the other at every instance (i.e., the vectors of the number of
unused slots). There must also be an instance where the first one transfers strictly more vacant slots
than the second one to the next group of slots according to the precedence sequence. Also, both of
the monotonic capacity transfer schemes take the capacity of the first group of slots with respect to the
precedence sequence equal to its target capacity. Holding all else constant, when the capacity transfer
scheme becomes more flexible, it defines a particular choice function expansion.20
Expanding the overall choice function of a single school leads to Pareto improvement for students under
the COM.21
Theorem 4. Suppose that Z is the outcome of the cumulative offer mechanism at (P,C), where P =
(Pi1 , ..., Pin) is the profile of student preferences and C = (Cs1 , ..., Csm) is the profile of schools’ overall
choice functions. Fix a school s ∈ S. Suppose that C˜s takes a capacity transfer scheme that is more
flexible than that of Cs, holding all else constant. Then, the outcome of the cumulative offer mechanism
at (P, (C˜s, C−s)), Z˜, Pareto dominates Z.
Proof. See Appendix 7.3.
Theorem 4 is of particular importance because it indicates that increasing the transferability of ca-
pacity from low-demand to high-demand groups leads to strategy-proof Pareto improvement with the
cumulative offer algorithm. This result provides a normative foundation for recommending a more flexible
interpretation of type-specific quotas. This result establishes that to maximize students’ welfare, schools’
choice functions should be expanded as much as possible.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies a school choice problem with distributional objectives where students care about both
the school they are matched with as well as the category through which they are admitted. Each school
can be thought of as union of different groups of slots, where each group is associated with exactly one
20The type of choice function expansion here is different than the one Chambers and Yenmez (2017) define. Their notion
of expansion is in the sense of set inclusion while ours is not. They say that a choice function C
′
is an expansion of another
choice function C if for every offer set Y , C(Y ) ⊆ C′(Y ). According to the expansion via a more flexible capacity transfer
scheme, when a choice function C expands to C
′
it is possible to have C(Y ) * C
′
(Y ) for some Y .
21Our strategy-proof Pareto improvement result is in line with the main finding of Alva and Manjunath (2019). The
authors offer an explanation in footnote 25 of their paper. The COM, where schools’ choice functions have substitutable
completions that satisfy the LAD, is non-wasteful. Thus, it is strategy-proof-constrained Pareto-efficient in their terminology.
Dynamic reserves choice functions have substitutable completions that satisfy the LAD as we explain in Appendix 7.2.
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category. Schools have target distributions over their groups of slots in the form of reserves. If these
reserves are considered to be hard bounds, then some slots will remain empty in instances where demand
for particular categories is less than their target capacities. To overcome this problem and to increase
efficiency, we design a family of dynamic reserves choice functions. We do so by allowing monotonic
capacity transfers across groups of slots when one or more of the groups is not able to fill to its target
capacity. The capacity transfer scheme is exogenously given for each school and governs the dynamic
capacities of groups, each of which has a q-responsive sub-choice function. The overall choice function of
a school can be thought of as the union of choices with these sub-choice functions of its groups.
We offer the COM with respect to dynamic reserves choice functions as an allocation rule. We show
that the COM is stable and strategy-proof in our framework. Moreover, the COM respects improvements.
We introduce a comparison criteria between two monotonic capacity transfer schemes. If a monotone
capacity transfer scheme transfers at least as many vacancies in every contingency compared to another
monotone capacity transfer scheme, we say that the first is more flexible than the second. We show that
when capacity transfer scheme of a school becomes more flexible, while other school choice functions remain
unchanged, the outcome of the COM under the modified profile of choice functions Pareto dominates the
outcome of the COM under the original profile. This result is the main message of our paper, as it describes
a strategy-proof Pareto improvement by making capacity transfers more flexible.
The realized distribution of applicants’ type is a concern22 for many applications. A potential short-
coming of our approach is that our model does not address such concerns. We leave this for future work.
7 APPENDICES
7.1 Formal Description of the Cumulative Offer Process
Cumulative Offer Process (COP): Consider the outcome the COM as denoted by ΦΓ (P,C). For
any preference profile P of students, profile of choice functions of schools C, and an ordering Γ of the
elements of X, the outcome is determined by the COP with respect to Γ, P and C as follows:
Step 0: Initialize the set of contracts available to the schools as A0 = ∅.
Step t ≥ 1: Consider the set
U t ≡
{
x ∈ X \At−1 : i(x) /∈ i (CS(At−1)) and @z ∈ (Xi(x) \At−1) ∪ {∅} such that zP i(x)x} .
If U t is empty, then the algorithm terminates and the outcome is given by CS(At−1).23 Otherwise,
letting yt be the highest-ranked element of U t according to Γ, we say that yt is proposed and set At =
At−1 ∪ {yt} and proceed to step t+ 1.
A COP begins with no contracts available to the schools (i.e., A0 = ∅). Then, at each step t, we
construct U t, the set of contracts that (1) have not yet been proposed, (2) are not associated to students
with contracts chosen by schools from the currently available set of contracts, and (3) are both acceptable
22We thank an anonymous referee for making this important point.
23We denote by CS(Y ) ≡ ∪s∈SCs(Y ) the set of contracts chosen by the set of schools from a set of contracts Y ⊆ X.
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and the most-preferred by their associated students among all contracts not yet proposed. If U t is empty,
then every student i either has some associated contract chosen by some school, i.e., i ∈ i (CS(At−1)), or
has no acceptable contracts left to propose, and so the COP ends. Otherwise, the contract in U t that is
highest-ranked according to Γ is proposed by its associated student, and the process proceeds to the next
step. Note that at some step this process must end as the number of contracts is finite.
Letting T denote the last step of the COP, we call AT the set of contracts observed in the COP with
respect to Γ, P , and C.
7.2 Substitutable Completion of Dynamic Reserves Choice Functions
Definition 8. A choice function Cs(·) satisfies the irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC) condition
if for all Y ⊂ X, for all z ∈ X \ Y , and z /∈ Cs (Y ∪ {z}) =⇒ Cs (Y ) = Cs (Y ∪ {z}).
Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) introduce the substitutability condition, which generalizes the earlier
gross substitutes condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982).
Definition 9. A choice function Cs(·) satisfies substitutability if for all z, z′ ∈ X, and Y ⊆ X,
z /∈ Cs (Y ∪ {z}) =⇒ z /∈ Cs (Y ∪ {z, z′}).
Definition 10. A choice function Cs (·) satisfies the law of aggregate demand (LAD) if Y ⊆ Y ′ =⇒|
Cs (Y ) | ≤ | Cs (Y ′) |.
The following definitions are from Hatfield and Kominers (2019). A completion of a many-to-one choice
function Cs(·) of school s ∈ S is a choice function Cs(·), such that for all Y ⊆ X, either Cs(Y ) = Cs(Y )
or there exists a distinct z, z′ ∈ Cs(Y ) such that i(z) = i(z′). If a choice function Cs(·) has a completion
that satisfies the substitutability and IRC condition, then we say that Cs(·) is substitutably completable.
If every choice function in a profile C = (Cs(·))s∈S is substitutably completable, then we say that C is
substitutably completable.
Let Cs(·, fs, qs) be a dynamic reserve choice function given the precedence sequence f s and the capacity
transfer scheme qs. We define a related choice function C
s
(·, fs, qs). Given a set of contracts Y ⊆ X,
C
s
(Y, f s, qs) denotes the set of chosen contracts from set Y and is determined as follows:
• Given q1s and Y = Y 0 ⊆ X, let Y1 ≡ cs1(Y 0, q1s, fs(1)) be the set of chosen contracts with privilege
fs(1) from Y 0. Let r1 = q1s− | Y1 | be the number of vacant slots. The set of remaining contracts is
then Y 1 = Y 0 \ Y1.
• In general, let Yk = csk(Y k−1, qks , fs(k)) be the set of chosen contracts with privilege fs(k) from the
set of available contracts Y k−1 , where qks = qks (r1, ..., rk−1) is the dynamic capacity of group of slots
k as a function of the vector of the number of unfilled slots (r1, ..., rk−1). Let rk = qks− | Yk | be the
number of vacant slots. The set of remaining contracts is then Y k = Y k−1 \ Yk−1.
• Given Y = Y 0 ⊆ X and the capacity of the first group of slots q1s , we define Cs(Y, f s, qs) =
cs1(Y
0, q1s, f
s(1)) ∪ ( λs∪
k=2
csk(Y
k−1, qks (r1, ..., rk−1), fs(k))).
The difference between Cs(·) and Cs(·) is as follows: In the computation of Cs(·), if a contract of a
student is chosen by some group of slots then his/her other contracts are removed for the rest of the choice
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procedure. However, in the computation of Cs(·) this is not the case. According to the choice procedure
C
s
(·), if a contract of a student is chosen, say, by group of slots k, then his/her other contracts will still
be available for the following groups of slots.
The following proposition shows that Cs(·) defined above is the completion of the dynamic reserves
choice function Cs(·).
Proposition 1. Cs(·) is a completion of Cs(·).
Proof. Let f s and qs be the precedence sequence and capacity transfer scheme of school s ∈ S,
respectively. Take an offer set Y = Y 0 ⊆ X and assume there is no pair of contracts z, z′ ∈ Y 0 such that
i(z) = i(z
′
) and z, z′ ∈ Cs(Y, f s, qs). We want to show that
C
s
(Y, f s, qs) = C
s(Y, f s, qs).
Let Yj be the set of contracts chosen by group of slots j and let Y j be the set of contracts that remains
in the choice procedure after group j selects according to dynamic reserve choice function C(·). Similarly,
let Y j be the set of contracts chosen by group of slots j and let Y
j be the set of contracts that remains
in the choice procedure after group j selects according to the completion C(·). Notice that Y 0 = Y 0.
Let rj and rj be the number of vacant slots in group of slots j in the choice procedures Cs(Y, f s, qs) and
C
s
(Y, f s, qs), respectively. Also, let q
j
s(r1, ..., rj−1) and q
j
s(r1, ..., rj−1) denote the dynamic capacities of
group of slots j under choice procedures Cs(Y, f s, qs) and C
s
(Y, f s, qs), respectively.
Given q¯1s and Y 0 = Y
0, we have Y 1 = cs1(Y 0, q¯1s , fs(1)) = Y1 by the construction of C
s. Moreover,
r1 = r1 and q2s(r1) = q2s(r1).
Suppose that for all j ∈ {2, ..., k − 1} we have Yj = Y j . We need to show that it holds for group of
slots k, i.e., Yk = Y k. Since the chosen set is the same in every group from 1 to k − 1 under C(·) and
C(·), the number of remaining slots in each group is the same as well. Then, the dynamic capacity of the
group of slots k are the same under choice procedures Cs(Y, f s, qs) and C
s
(Y, f s, qs), i.e., qks (r1, ..., rk−1) =
qks(r1, ..., rk−1). Since there are no two contracts of an agent chosen by C
s
(Y, f s, qs), one can deduce that
all of the remaining contracts of agents, whose contracts were chosen by previous sub-choice functions, are
rejected by csk(Y
k−1
, qks(r1, ..., rk−1), fs(k)). Therefore, the IRC of the sub-choice function implies that
csk(Y
k−1
, qks(r1, ..., rk−1), f
s(k)) = csk(Y
k−1, qks (r1, ..., rk−1), f
s(k)).
Hence, we have Y k = Yk, rk = rk, and qk+1s (r1, ..., rk) = qk+1s (r1, ..., rk).
Since in each group of slots the same sets of contracts are chosen by the dynamic reserve choice function
and its completion, the result follows.
Proposition 2. Cs(·) satisfies the IRC.
Proof. For any Y ⊆ X such that Y 6= Cs(Y, f s, qs), let x be one of the rejected contracts, i.e.,
x ∈ Y \ Cs(Y, f s, qs). To show that the IRC is satisfied, we need to prove that
C
s
(Y, f s, qs) = C
s
(Y \ {x}, fs, qs).
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Let Y˜ = Y \ {x}. Let (Y j , r¯j , Y j) be the sequence of the set of chosen contracts, the number of
vacant slots, and the remaining set of contracts for group j = 1, ..., λs from Y under C(·). Similarly, let
(Y˜j , r˜j , Y˜
j) be the sequence of the set of chosen contracts, the number of vacant slots, and the remaining
set of contracts for group j = 1, ..., λs from Y˜ under C(·).
For the first group of slots, since the sub-choice functions satisfy the IRC, we have Y 1 = Y˜1. Moreover,
r¯1 = r˜1 and Y
1 \ {x} = Y˜ 1. By induction, for each j = 2, ..., k − 1, assume that
Y j = Y˜j , r¯j = r˜j , and Y
j \ {x} = Y˜ j .
We need to show that the above equalities hold for j = k. Since , x /∈ Cs(Y, f s, qs) and the sub-choice
functions satisfy the IRC condition we have
csk(Y
k−1
, qks (r1, ..., rk−1), f
s(k)) = csk(Y˜
k−1, qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1), f
s(k)).
The same set of contracts is chosen for group k in the choice processes beginning with Y and Y ∪ {x},
respectively. By our inductive assumption that r¯j = r˜j for each j = 2, ..., k − 1, the dynamic capacity of
group k is the same under both choice processes. The number of remaining slots is the same as well, i.e.,
r¯k = r˜k. Finally, we know that x is chosen from the set Y˜ k−1 ∪ {x}, then we have
Y
k
= Y˜ k ∪ {x}.
Since for all j ∈ {1, ..., λs}, Y j = Y˜j , we have Cs(Y, f s, qs) = Cs(Y˜ , fs, qs). Hence, Cs(·, fs, qs) satisfies
the IRC.
Proposition 3. Cs(·) satisfies the substitutability.
Proof. Consider an offer set Y ⊆ X such that Y 6= Cs(Y, f s, qs). Let x be one of the rejected contracts,
i.e., x ∈ Y \ Cs(Y, f s, qs), and let z be an arbitrary contract in X \ Y . To show substitutability, we need
to show that
x /∈ Cs(Y ∪ {z}, fs, qs).
Consider Y˜ = Y ∪ {z}. Let (Yj , rj , Y j) be the sequence of the set chosen contracts, the number of vacant
slots, and the set of remaining contracts for group of slots j = 1, ..., λs from Y under C(·). Similarly,
let (Y˜j , r˜j , Y˜ j) be the sequence of the set chosen contracts, the number of vacant slots, and the set of
remaining contracts for group of slots j = 1, ..., λs from Y˜ under C(·). There are two cases to consider:
Case 1 z ∈ Y˜ \ Cs(Y˜ , fs, qs).
In this case, the IRC of Cs implies Cs(Y˜ , fs, qs) = C
s
(Y, f s, qs). Therefore, x /∈ Cs(Y˜ , fs, qs).
Case 2 z ∈ Cs(Y˜ , fs, qs).
Let j be the group of slots such that z ∈ Y˜j . By the IRC of sub-choice functions, x /∈ Y˜j = Yj , for all
j
′
= 1, ..., j − 1. Moreover, Y˜ j′−1 = Y j′−1 ∪ {z} and r˜j′ = rj′ , for all j
′
= 1, ..., j − 1.
First note that the dynamic capacity of group j is the same under choice procedures beginning with
Y = Y 0 and Y ∪ {z} = Y˜ 0, respectively. This is because the number of unused slots from groups 1 to
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j − 1 are the same under the two choice procedures. We know that z is chosen exactly at group j in the
process beginning with Y˜ 0. There are two cases here:
(a) The dynamic capacity of group j is exhausted in the process beginning with Y 0. In this case, by
choosing z from Y˜ 0 another contract, we say that say y ∈ Y˜ 0 is rejected even though y was chosen at
group j in the process beginning with Y 0.
(b) The dynamic capacity of group j is not exhausted in the choice process beginning with Y 0. In
this case, z is chosen at group j in the process beginning with Y˜ 0 without rejecting any contract that was
chosen in the process beginning with Y 0 at group j.
In the case of (a),
| csj(Y j−1, qjs(r1, ..., rj−1), fs(j)) |= qjs(r1, ..., rj−1)
and
z ∈ csj(Y˜ j−1, qjs(r1, ..., rj−1), fs(j))
implies that there exists a contract y such that
y ∈ csj(Y j−1, qjs(r1, ..., rj−1), fs(j)) \ csj(Y˜ j−1, qjs(r˜1, ..., r˜j−1), fs(j)).
This implies that Y˜ j = Y j ∪ {y}. Since the capacity of group j is exhausted under both choice processes,
the number of vacant slots for group j will be 0 in both choice processes. Thus, the capacity will be the
same for group j + 1 under both.
Notice that
x /∈ Yj =⇒ x /∈ Y˜j
because
csj(Y
j−1, qjs(r1, ..., rj−1), f
s(j)) ∪ {z} \ {y} = csj(Y˜ j−1, qjs(r˜1, ..., r˜j−1), fs(j)).
In case (b), we have
| csj(Y j−1, qjs(r1, ..., rj−1), fs(j)) |< qjs(r1, ..., rj−1).
Hence, rj > 0. Then, since the sub-choice functions are responsive, we have
csj(Y˜
j−1, qjs(r˜1, ..., r˜j−1), f
s(j)) = {z} ∪ csj(Y j−1, qjs(r1, ..., rj−1), fs(j)).
Therefore,
x /∈ Yj =⇒ x /∈ Y˜j .
We also have rj = r˜j + 1. Moreover, the set of remaining contracts under both choice processes will be
the same, i.e., Y˜ j = Y j . The facts rj′ = r˜j′ for all j
′
= 1, ..., j − 1 and rj = r˜j + 1 implies—by the
monotonicity of capacity transfer schemes—that either
qj+1s (r1, ..., rj) = q
j+1
s (r˜1, ..., r˜j)
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or
qj+1s (r1, ..., rj) = 1 + q
j+1
s (r˜1, ..., r˜j)
hold.
Suppose now that for all γ = j, ..., k − 1 we have that either[
Y˜ γ = Y γ ∪ {y˜} for some y˜ and qγ+1s (r˜1, ..., r˜γ) = qγ+1s (r1, ..., rγ)
]
or [
Y˜ γ = Y γ and qγ+1s (r˜1, ..., r˜γ) ≤ qγ+1s (r1, ..., rγ) ≤ 1 + qγ+1s (r˜1, ..., r˜γ)
]
.
We have already shown that it holds for γ = j and we will now show that it also holds for γ = k.
We will first analyze the former case. By inductive assumption, we have Y˜ k−1 = Y k−1 ∪ {y˜} for some
contract y˜. If y˜ is not chosen from the set Y˜ k−1 then exactly the same set of contracts will be chosen from
Y k−1 and Y˜ k−1 since the capacities of group k are the same under both choice processes and the sub-choice
function satisfies the IRC condition. Then, we will have Y˜ k = Y k ∪ {y˜}. Moreover, since the number of
vacant slots at group k will be the same under both processes, we will have qk+1s (r1, ..., rj) = qk+1s (r˜1, ..., r˜j).
If y˜ is chosen from the set Y˜ k−1, we have two sub-cases, depending on if the dynamic capacity of group k
is exhausted under the choice process beginning with Y 0. If it is not exhausted, then we will have
csk(Y˜
k−1, qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1), f
s(k)) = {y˜} ∪ csk(Y k−1, qks (r1, ..., rk−1), fs(k)),
which implies that Y˜ k = Y k. Moreover, we will have rk = r˜k + 1. The monotonicity of capacity transfer
scheme implies that
qk+1s (r˜1, ..., r˜k) ≤ qk+1s (r1, ..., rk) ≤ 1 + qk+1s (r˜1, ..., r˜k).
The first inequality follows from the fact that r˜i ≤ ri for all i = 1, ..., k. The second inequality follows
from the second condition of the monotonicity of the capacity transfer schemes.
On the other hand, if the dynamic capacity of group k is exhausted in the choice procedure beginning
with Y 0, then choosing y˜ from the set Y˜ k−1 implies that there exists a contract y that is chosen from Y k−1
but rejected from Y˜ k−1. Then, we will have Y˜ k = Y k ∪ {y} since the sub-choice function is q-responsive
and group k’s capacities are the same under both choice processes. In this case, we will have rk = r˜k = 0.
Since r˜i ≤ ri for all i = 1, ..., k, we will have qk+1s (r˜1, ..., r˜k) ≤ qk+1s (r1, ..., rk) from the first condition of
the monotonicity of the capacity transfer scheme. Since qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1) = qks (r1, ..., rk−1) and r˜k = rk, we
will have qk+1s (r˜1, ..., r˜k) ≥ qk+1s (r1, ..., rk) by the second condition of the monotonicity of capacity transfer
schemes.24
We will now analyze the latter case in which we have Y˜ k−1 = Y k−1 and either qks (r1, ..., rk−1) =
qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1) or qks (r1, ..., rk−1) = 1 + qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1).
If qks (r1, ..., rk−1) = qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1), then given that Y˜ k−1 = Y k−1, we will have Y˜ k = Y k. This also
implies rk = r˜k. Moreover, we obtain qk+1s (r1, ..., rk) = qk+1s (r˜1, ..., r˜k) by the monotonicity of capacity
24In the second condition of the monotonicity of the capacity transfer schemes, if the number of vacant slots is written
as the dynamic capacity of the group minus the number of chosen contracts then we will have the following: the dynamic
capacity of the group k + 1 in the choice process beginning with Y minus the dynamic capacity of the group k + 1 in the
choice process beginning with Y ∪ {z} = Y˜ 0 must be less than or equal to the summation of the difference of the number of
chosen contracts from group 1 to group k, which is 0 in this specific case.
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transfer scheme. Note that r˜i ≤ ri for all i = 1, ..., k implies qk+1s (r1, ..., rk) ≥ qk+1s (r˜1, ..., r˜k) by the first
condition of the monotonicity of capacity transfers. The second condition of the monotonicity of capacity
transfers implies qk+1s (r1, ..., rk) ≤ qk+1s (r˜1, ..., r˜k).
If qks (r1, ..., rk−1) = 1 + qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1), then given Y˜ k−1 = Y k−1, we have two sub-cases here.
Sub-case 1. If
csk(Y˜
k−1, qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1), f
s(k)) = csk(Y
k−1, qks (r1, ..., rk−1), f
s(k)),
then we will have Y˜ k = Y k. Also, the monotonicity of capacity transfer scheme implies that
qk+1s (r˜1, ..., r˜k) ≤ qk+1s (r1, ..., rk) ≤ 1 + qk+1s (r˜1, ..., r˜k).
Sub-case 2. If
csk(Y˜
k−1, qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1), f
s(k)) ∪ {y∗} = csk(Y k−1, qks (r1, ..., rk−1), fs(k))
for some y∗, then we will have Y˜ k = Y k ∪ {y∗}. Moreover, the monotonicity of capacity transfer
schemes in this case implies that
qk+1s (r1, ..., rk) = q
k+1
s (r˜1, ..., r˜k).
This is because given r˜i ≤ ri for all i = 1, ..., k the first condition of the monotonicity of the capacity
transfers implies that qk+1s (r1, ..., rk) ≥ qk+1s (r˜1, ..., r˜k). On the other hand, the second condition of the
monotonicity of the capacity transfers implies that qk+1s (r1, ..., rk) ≤ qk+1s (r˜1, ..., r˜k).
Since x /∈ Yk, we will have x /∈ Y˜k for all k = 1, ..., λs. Thus, we can conclude that x /∈ Cs(Y ∪
{z}, fs, qs), which tells us that the completion Cs satisfies the substitutability condition.
Proposition 4. Cs(·) satisfies the LAD.
Proof. Consider two sets of contracts Y and Y˜ such that Y ⊆ Y˜ ⊆ X. Let fs and qs be the precedence
sequence and the capacity transfer scheme of school s ∈ S. We want to show that
| Cs(Y, fs, qs) |≤| Cs(Y˜ , fs, qs) | .
Let (Yj , rj , Y j) be the sequences of sets of chosen contracts, numbers of vacant slots and sets of
remaining contracts for groups j = 1, ..., λs under choice processes beginning with Y = Y 0. Similarly, let
(Y˜j , r˜j , Y˜
j) be the sequences of sets of chosen contracts, numbers of vacant slots and sets of remaining
contracts for groups j = 1, ..., λs under choice processes beginning with Y˜ 0 = Y˜ .
For the first group with capacity q1s, since the sub-choice function is q-responsive (and thus implies the
LAD), we have
| Y1 |=| cs1(Y 0, q1s, fs(1)) |≤| cs1(Y˜ 0, q1s, fs(1)) |=| Y˜1 | .
Then, it implies that r1 = q1s− | Y1 |≥ r˜1 = q1s− | Y˜1 |. Moreover, we have Y 1 ⊆ Y˜ 1. To see this, consider
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a y ∈ Y 1. It means that y /∈ Y1. If y is not chosen from a smaller set Y 0, then it cannot be chosen from a
larger set Y˜ 0 because sub-choice function is q-responsive (hence, substitutable).
Suppose that r˜j ≤ rj and Y j ⊆ Y˜ j hold for all j = 1, ..., k − 1. We need to show that both of them
hold for group k.
Given that r˜j ≤ rj for all j = 1, ..., k − 1, the first condition of the monotonicity implies that
qks (r1, ..., rk−1) ≥ qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1). The second condition of the monotonicity puts an upper bound for
the difference between qks (r1, ..., rk−1) and qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1). For group k
| Yk | − | Y˜k |≤| Yk | − | csk(Y k−1, qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1, fs(k)) |
because
| Y˜k |=| csk(Y˜ k−1, qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1), fs(k)) |≥| csk(Y k−1, qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1), fs(k)) |
by the q-responsiveness of the sub-choice function. We then have
| Yk | − | csk(Y k−1, qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1, fs(k)) |≤ qks (r1, ..., rk−1)− qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1).
This follows from q-responsiveness because | Yk | − | csk(Y k−1, qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1, fs(k)) | is the difference
between the number of chosen contracts when the capacity is (weakly) increased from qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1) to
qks (r1, ..., rk−1). Hence, the difference | Yk | − | csk(Y k−1, qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1, fs(k)) | cannot exceed the increase
in the capacity which is qks (r1, ..., rk−1)− qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1). Therefore, now we have
| Yk | − | Y˜k |≤ qks (r1, ..., rk−1)− qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1).
Rearranging gives us
qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)− | Y˜k |≤ qks (r1, ..., rk−1)− | Yk |,
which is r˜k ≤ rk.
Given that Y k−1 ⊆ Y˜ k−1 and qks (r1, ..., rk−1) ≥ qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1), we will have Y k ⊆ Y˜ k. For an
explanation, consider a contract x ∈ Y k. That means that x ∈ Y k−1 but x is not chosen from Y k−1 when
the capacity is qks (r1, ..., rk−1), i.e., x /∈ csk(Y k−1, qks (r1, ..., rk−1), fs(x)). When the capacity is reduced to
qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1) and the set Y k−1 is expanded to Y˜ k−1, x cannot be chosen because the sub-choice function
is q-responsive. Hence, it must be the case that x ∈ Y˜ k.
Now let ηj = rj − r˜j . As we just proved above, ηj ≥ 0 for all j = 1, ..., λs. Plugging rj =
qjs(r1, ..., rj−1)− | Yj | and r˜j = qks (r˜1, ..., r˜k−1)− | Y˜j | in ηj = rj − r˜j gives us
| Y˜j |= qjs(r1, ..., rj−1)− qjs(r˜1, ..., r˜j−1)+ | Y j | +ηj .
Summing both the right and left hand sides for j = 1, ..., λs yields
λs∑
j=1
| Y˜j |=
λs∑
j=1
| Yj | +
λs∑
j=2
[
qjs(r1, ..., rj−1)− qjs(r˜1, ..., r˜j−1)
]
+
λs∑
j=1
ηj .
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Since each ηj ≥ 0, we have
λs∑
j=1
| Y˜j |≥
λs∑
j=1
| Yj | +
λs∑
j=2
[
qjs(r1, ..., rj−1)− qjs(r˜1, ..., r˜j−1)
]
.
Also, we know that qjs(r1, ..., rj−1) ≥ qjs(r˜1, ..., r˜j−1) for all j = 2, ..., λs by the first condition of the
monotonicity of the capacity transfer scheme as, ri ≥ r˜i for all i = 1, ..., j − 1 (Notice that for j = 1, the
capacity is fixed to q1s under both processes.) Therefore, we have
λs∑
j=1
| Y˜j |≥
λs∑
j=1
| Yj |,
which means | Cs(Y, f s, qs) |≤| Cs(Y˜ , fs, qs) |.
7.3 Proofs of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1
In Proposition 1 we showed that each dynamic reserve choice function has a completion. Propositions 2
and 3 show that the completion satisfies the IRC and substitutability conditions, respectively. Then, by
Theorem 2 of Hatfield and Kominers (2019), there exists a stable outcome with respect to the profile of
schools’ choice functions.
Proof of Theorem 2
In Proposition 4 we showed that the substitutable completion satisfies the LAD. Then, by the Theorem 3
of Hatfield and Kominers (2019), the COM is (weakly) group strategy-proof for students.
Proof of Theorem 3
Fix a student i ∈ I. Assume, toward a contradiction, that the COM does not respect unambiguous
improvements. Then, there exists a student i ∈ I, a preference profile of students P ∈ ×i∈IP i, and
priority profiles Π and Π such that Π is an unambiguous improvement over Π for student i and
ϕi(P ; Π)P
iϕi(P ; Π).
Let ϕi(P ; Π) = x and ϕi(P ; Π) = x. Consider a preference P˜ i of student i according to which the only
acceptable contract is x, i.e., P˜ i : x− ∅i. Let P˜ = (P˜ i, P−i). We will first prove the following claim:
Claim: ϕi(P˜ ; Π) = x =⇒ ϕi(P˜ ; Π) = x.
Proof of the Claim: Consider the outcome of the COM under priority profile Π given the preference
profile of students P˜ . Recall that the order in which students make offers has no impact on the outcome of
the COP. We can thus completely ignore student i and run the COP until it stops. Let Y be the resulting
set of contracts. At this point, student i makes an offer for his only contract x. This might create a chain
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of rejections, but it does not reach student i. So, his contract x is chosen by s(x) by, say, the group k with
respect to the precedence sequence f s(x) of school s(x). Now consider the COP under priority profile Π.
Again, we completely ignore student i and run the COP until it stops. The same outcome Y is obtained,
because the only difference between the two COPs is student i’s position in the priority rankings. At
this point, student i makes an offer for his only contract x. If x is chosen by the same group k, then the
same rejection chain (if there was one in the COP under the priority profile Π) will occur and it does not
reach student i; otherwise, we would have a contradiction with the case under priority profile Π. The only
other possibility is the following: since student i’s ranking is now (weakly) better under pis(x) compared
to pis(x), his contract x might be chosen by group l < k. Then, it must be the case that rl = 0 in the
COP under both priority profiles Π and Π. Therefore, by selecting x, the group l must reject some other
contract. Let us call this contract y. If no contract of student i(y) = j is chosen between groups l and
k, then, by the q-responsiveness of sub-choice functions, the groups’ chosen sets between l and k under
both priority profiles are the same. Hence, the number of remaining slots would be the same. In this case,
y is chosen in the group k. Thus, if a rejection chain starts, it will not reach student i; otherwise, we
could have a contradiction due to the fact that x was chosen at the end of the COP under priority profile
Π. A different contract of student j cannot be chosen between groups l and k; otherwise, the observable
substitutability25 of dynamic reserves choice function of school s(x) would be violated. Therefore, if any
contract of student j is chosen by these groups between l and k, it must be y. If y is chosen by a group
that precedes k, then it must replace a contract—we call it z. By the same reasoning, no other contract
of student i(z) can be chosen before group k; otherwise, we would violate the observable substitutability
of the dynamic reserve choice function of school s(x). Proceeding in this fashion leads the same contract
in group k to be rejected and initiates the same rejection chain that occurs under priority profile Π. Since
the same rejection chain does not reach student i under priority profile Π, it will not reach student i under
priority profile Π, which ends our proof for the claim.
Since ϕi(P ; Π) = x and ϕi(P ; Π) = x such that xP ix, if student i misreports and submits P˜ i under
priority profile Π , then she can successfully manipulate the COM. This is a contradiction because we have
already established that the COM is strategy-proof.
Proof of Theorem 4
Consider school s ∈ S with a precedence sequence fs and a target capacity vector (q1s, ..., qλss ). Let q˜s and
qs be two capacity transfer schemes that are compatible with the precedence sequence fs and the target
capacity vector (q1s, ..., qλss ). Suppose that the following two conditions hold:
• there exists l ∈ {2, ..., λs} and (rˆ1, ..., rˆl−1) ∈ Zl−1+ , such that q˜ls(rˆ1, ..., rˆl−1) = 1+qls(rˆ1, ..., rˆl−1), and
• for all j ∈ {2, ..., λs} and (r1, ..., rj−1) ∈ Zj−1+ , if j 6= l or (r1, ..., rj−1) 6= (rˆ1, ..., rˆl−1), then
q˜js(r1, ..., rj−1) = q
j
s(r1, ..., rj−1).
Let C˜s and Cs be dynamic reserves choice functions C˜s(·, fs, q˜s) and Cs(·, fs, qs), respectively. Let C˜ =(
C˜s, C−s
)
and C = (Cs, C−s). Let the outcomes of the cumulative offer algorithm at
(
P, C˜
)
and (P,C)
25Dynamic reserves choice functions satisfy observable substitutability condition of Hatfield et al. (2019). We refer
readers to Hatfield et al. (2019) for the definitions of observable offer processes and observable substitutability. Since
dynamic reserves choice functions have substitutable completion that satisfies the size monotonicity, it satisfies observable
substitutability.
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be Z˜ and Z, respectively. If Z˜ = Z, then there is nothing to prove because it means the capacity flexibility
of school s does not bite.
Suppose that Z˜ 6= Z. That is, the capacity flexibility of school s bites, which means that there is a
student who was rejected under Cs who is no longer rejected under C˜s. We now define an improvement
chains algorithm that starts with outcome Z. Since the capacity flexibility bites, the vector (rˆ1, ..., rˆl−1)
must occur in the choice procedure of school s.
Step 1: Consider students who prefer (s, fs(l)) to their assignments under Z, i.e.,
I˜
(s,fs(l))
1 = {i ∈ I | (s, fs(l))P iZi}.
We choose pis-maximal student in I˜(s,f
s(l))
1 (if any), call her i˜1, and assign her x˜1 = (˜i1, s, f
s(l)). Update
the outcome to Z˜1 = Z ∪ {x˜1} \ z1 where z1 is the contract student i˜1 receives under Z.
If (s(z1), t(z1)) = ∅, then the improvement process ends and we have Z˜ = Z˜1 = Z ∪ {x˜1}. Otherwise,
we move to Step 2 because by assigning i˜1 to (s, fs(l)) we create a vacancy in school s(z1) within the
privilege t(z1).
If I˜(s,f
s(l))
1 = ∅, then the number of vacant slots at the last group accepting students in type f s(l) will
increase by one. When the capacity transfer scheme of school s does not transfer this extra vacancy to any
other group following the last group in type f s(l) in the computation of Cs(Zs, fs, q˜s), the improvement
chain process ends and we have Z˜ = Z. If the extra slot is transferred to the group l′ that follows the last
group in type fs(l) in the computation of Cs(Zs, fs, q˜s), then we consider students who prefer (s, fs(l
′
))
over their assignments under Z, i.e.,
I
(s,fs(l
′
))
1 = {i ∈ I | (s, fs(l
′
))P iZi}.
We choose pis-maximal student in I(s,f
s(l
′
))
1 (if there is any), call her i˜1, and assign her x˜1 = (˜i1, s, f
s(l
′
)).
Update the outcome to Z˜1 = Z ∪ {x˜1} \ z1 where z1 is the contract i˜1 receives under Z.
If (s(z1), t(z1)) = ∅, then the improvement process ends and we have Z˜ = Z˜1 = Z ∪ {x˜1}. Otherwise,
we move to Step 2. Because assigning i˜1 to (s, fs(l
′
)) creates a vacancy in school s(z1) within the privilege
t(z1).
If I˜(s,f
s(l
′
))
1 = ∅, then the number of vacant slots at the last group that accepts students in type fs(l
′
)
will increase by one. If the capacity transfer scheme of school s does not transfer this extra vacancy
to any other group following the last group that accepts students of type fs(l′) in the computation of
Cs(Zs, f
s, q˜s), then the improvement chain process ends and we have Z˜ = Z. If the extra slot is transferred
to the group l′′ that follows the last group that accepts students in type fs(l′) in the computation of
Cs(Zs, f
s, q˜s), then we consider students who prefer (s, fs(l
′′
)) over their assignments under Z, and so on.
Since school s has finitely many groups, Step 1 ends in finitely many iterations. If no extra student
is assigned to school s by the end of Step 1, then the improvement chains algorithm ends and we have
Z˜ = Z. If an extra student is assigned to school s by the end of Step 1, then we move on to Step 2.
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Step t>1: Consider students who prefer (s(zt−1), t(zt−1)) to their assignments under Z˜t−1, i.e.,
I˜
(s(zt−1),t(zt−1))
t = {i ∈ I | (s(zt−1), t(zt−1))P i(Z˜t−1)i}.
We choose pis(zt−1)-maximal student in I˜(s(zt−1),t(zt−1))t , call her i˜t, and assign her x˜t = (˜it, s(zt−1), t(zt−1)).
Update the outcome to Z˜t = Z˜t−1 ∪ {x˜t} \ zt where zt is the contract student i˜t receives under Z˜t−1.
If (s(zt−1), t(zt−1)) = ∅, then the improvement algorithm ends and we have Z˜ = Z˜t = Z˜t−1 ∪ {x˜t}.
Otherwise, we move to Step t + 1. Because assigning i˜t to (s(zt−1), t(zt−1)) creates a vacancy in school
s(zt) within type t(zt).
If I˜(s(zt−1),t(zt−1))t = ∅, then the number of vacant slots at the last group that accepts students in
type f s(zt−1) will increase by one. If the capacity transfer scheme of school s(zt−1) does not transfer this
extra capacity to any other group following the last group that accepts students in type t(zt−1) in the
computation of Cs(zt−1)((Z˜t−1)s(zt−1), f
s(zt−1), qs(zt−1)), then the improvement chains process ends and we
have Z˜ = Z˜t−1. If the extra slot is transferred to the group of slot m that follows the last group that
accepts students in type t(zt−1) in the computation of Cs(zt−1)((Z˜t−1)s(zt−1), f
s(zt−1), qs(zt−1)), then we
consider students who prefer (s(zt−1), f s(zt−1)(m)) over their assignments under Z˜t−1, i.e.,
I˜
(s(zt−1),fs(zt−1)(m))
t = {i ∈ I | (s(zt−1), f s(zt−1)(m))P i(Z˜t−1)i}.
We choose pis(zt−1)-maximal student in I˜(s(zt−1),f
s(zt−1)(m))
t , call her i˜t, and assign her x˜t = (˜it, s(zt−1), f s(zt−1)(m)).
Update the outcome to Z˜t = Z˜t−1 ∪ {x˜t} \ zt where zt is the contract student i˜t receives under Z˜t−1.
If (s(zt−1), f s(zt−1)(m)) = ∅, then the improvement algorithm ends and we have Z˜ = Z˜t = Z˜t−1 ∪{x˜t}.
Otherwise, we move to Step t+1. Because assigning i˜t to (s(zt−1), f s(zt−1)(m)) creates a vacancy in school
s(zt) within type t(zt).
If I˜(s(zt−1),t(zt−1))t = ∅, then the number of vacant slots at the last group that accepts students in
type f s(zt−1) will increase by one. If the capacity transfer scheme of school s(zt−1) does not transfer this
extra capacity to any other group following the last group that accepts students in type f s(zt−1)(m) in the
computation of Cs(zt−1)((Z˜t−1)s(zt−1), f
s(zt−1), qs(zt−1)), then the improvement chains process ends and we
have Z˜ = Z˜t−1. If the extra slot is transferred to the group of slot m
′ that follows the last group that
accepts students in type f s(zt−1)(m) in the computation of Cs(zt−1)((Z˜t−1)s(zt−1), f
s(zt−1), qs(zt−1)), then we
consider students who prefer (s(zt−1), f s(zt−1)(m
′
)) over their assignments under Z˜t−1, and so on.
Since school s(zt−1) has finitely many groups , Step t ends in finitely many iterations. If no extra
student is assigned to school s(zt−1) by the end of Step t, then the improvement chains algorithm ends
and we have Z˜ = Z˜t−1. If an extra student is assigned to school s(zt−1) by the end of Step t, then we
move on to Step t+ 1.
This process ends in finitely many iterations because there are finitely many contracts and when we
move to the next step it means a student is made strictly better off. Also, notice that no student is
worse off during the execution of the improvement chains algorithm. The improvement algorithm, by
construction, starts with the outcome Φ(P,C) and ends at Φ(P, C˜). Hence, we have Φi(P, C˜)RiΦi(P,C)
for all i ∈ I.
We define the sequence of capacity transfer schemes and dynamic reserve choice functions for school
s ∈ S: ((qs)1, (qs)2, ...) and (Cs(Y, f s, (qs)1), Cs(Y, f s, (qs)2), ...). Let the sequence Φ(P,C1), Φ(P,C2),...
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denote the outcomes of the COPs at profiles (P, (Cs(·, fs, (qs)1), C−s)) and (P, (Cs(·, fs, (qs)2), C−s)),...,
respectively. Hence, by construction, we have Φi(P,Ca+1)RiΦi(P,Ca) for all i ∈ I and a ≥ 1. By the
transitivity of weak preferences, we have Φi(P, C˜)RiΦ(P,C) for all i ∈ I.
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